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Ⅰ　Introduction
　Understanding the emotions of  others 
i s  r equ i r ed  for  e f f e c t i v e  in t e rper sona l 
communication and is an especially important 
developmental task for children. Two directions 
in the development of emotion understanding 
have been identified (Kondo, 2017): One is the 
process by which children come to understand the 
emotions of others, and another is the process 
by which children become aware that they may 
not fully understand the emotions other people 
are experiencing, in other words, that there is 
uncertainty in their knowledge of the emotions of 
others. The results of many studies of the former 
process suggest that (1) emotion understanding 
at the perceptual level appears several months 
after birth (e.g., Young-Brown et al., 2013), (2) 
emotion understanding at the inference level 
improves over preschool childhood (Deconti & 
Dickerson, 1994; Michalson & Lewis, 1985), and 
(3) understanding complicated emotions (e.g., the 
real-appearance distinction) is acquired during 
middle childhood (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999; Harris 
et al., 1986; for a review, see also Kondo, 2014a).
　On the other hand, few studies have examined 
the process by which children become aware of 
uncertainty about others’ emotions. For example, 
in Kondo (2014b), 3- to 6-year-old children were 
asked to infer the emotion of another in an 
“equivocal” situation in which they were not 
given enough information to judge the other’s 
emotional response; for example, a beetle falls 
on a child’s arm, but it is unknown whether or 
not the child likes bugs and would enjoy this 
experience. The results indicated that children 
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began to make “Don’t Know” (DK) responses in 
inferring the emotion of others at 6 years of age. 
However, studies of preschool children (Kondo, 
2014b, 2017) have not revealed when it is that 
people fully recognize that they don’t know the 
emotions of others. To clarify the developmental 
process of recognizing uncertainty about the 
emotions of others, it is important to establish 
its developmental end point.
　When do people recognize uncertainty about 
the emotions of others? In Gnepp and Domanic 
(1987), children aged 5 to 8 inferred the emotions 
of characters in unequivocal situations, which 
elicit only positive or negative emotional 
reactions, and equivocal situations, which 
commonly elicit positive emotional reactions in 
some people and negative reactions in others. 
With increasing age, children came to consider 
both positive and negative emotional possibilities 
for the equivocal situation, but even 8-year-olds 
often failed to distinguish between unequivocal 
and equivocal situations (p.121). In Gnepp and 
Klayman (1992), 6-, 8-, and 12-year-old children 
and 19-year-old adults (college students) 
inferred the emotions of story characters in 
equivocal situations. Compared with the other 
age groups, 6-year-olds had greater difficulty 
considering more than one emotional possibility. 
These studies suggest that the uncertainty of 
emotions of others is recognized through middle 
childhood. On the other hand, college students 
also had some difficulty recognizing equivocal 
situations. In other words, it is possible that 
people around 20 years of age are both aware 
and unaware of uncertainty about the emotions 
of others. Therefore, in order to investigate 
the developmental end point of recognizing 
the uncertainty of emotions of others, it is 
important to examine people at this age (i.e., 
around 20 years old). Although Gnepp and 
Klayman investigated whether children (or 
college students) consider more than one emotion 
in equivocal situation, they did not examine DK 
responses directly. Thus it is not clear whether 
college students provide DK responses when 
they infer the emotions of others in equivocal 
situations. The present study investigated how 
people of college age make DK responses when 
they infer the emotions of others in equivocal 
situations. Four main aspects of emotion 
inference were examined.
　1. Situation. As mentioned above, in an 
unequivocal situation, almost everyone feels the 
same emotion (e.g., win the lottery, lose a wallet); 
thus it should be easy to infer either positive 
or negative emotion. An equivocal situation is 
one which elicits different emotions depending 
on the person experiencing it (e.g., have a dog, 
eat a tomato) (Gnep, McKee, & Domanic, 1987; 
Gnepp & Klayman, 1992). Thus when one infers 
the emotions of another person about whom 
there is inadequate information (e.g., whether or 
not he likes dogs), a DK response is the correct 
answer. In previous research, such situations 
were developed for children (Gnepp, McKee, 
& Domanic, 1987; Gnepp & Klayman, 1992). 
The present study developed unequivocal and 
equivocal situations for adults and investigated 
how people make DK responses for each 
situation. Hypothesis 1 was that DK responses 
would be more frequent in equivocal situations 
than in unequivocal situations.
　2. Person (self versus other). In the study by 
Kondo (2014b), DK responses were more frequent 
in conditions in which participants made 
inferences about the emotions of others (other 
emotion condition: OEC) than when they inferred 
their own emotions (self emotion condition: SEC). 
The fact that participants inferred some emotion 
(positive or negative) in SEC while also making 
DK responses in OEC is evidence that they 
recognized their own uncertainty about others’ 
emotions. Hypothesis 2 of the present study is 
that DK responses would be more frequent in 
OEC than in SEC.
　3. Order of inferencing about emotions. More 
DK responses were observed in a study in which 
both SEC and OEC were included (Kondo, 2014b) 
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than in one consisting of only OEC (Kondo, 2017). 
This suggests that inferring emotions of the self 
activates self-consciousness, which makes the 
difference between self and others more clear. 
This present study compared a condition in which 
SEC was presented first (self-first condition: SFC) 
with a condition in which OEC was presented 
first (other-first condition: OFPC). Hypothesis 3 
is that DK responses would be more frequent in 
SFC than in OFC.
　4. Correspondences between DK responses 
in SEC and those in OEC. Previous studies of 
the process of inferring another’s emotions 
or behaviors (e.g., Van Boven & Lowenstein, 
2003; Kondo & Ikegami, 2012) have suggested 
that an egocentric process of inferencing about 
the self is projected for inferencing about the 
other. In other words, these studies suggest that 
a correspondence exists between inferencing 
the self and inferencing the other. However, 
it is possible that DK responses in inferring 
the emotions of others are actually based on 
recognition of the difference between self and 
other, rather than on the operation of an 
egocentric process. Thus the egocentric process 
may be unrelated to the recognition of the 
uncertainty about the emotions of others and 
corresponding DK responses. Thus Hypothesis 4 
holds that if the egocentric process is not related 
to DK responses in inferring the emotions of 
others, DK responses in SEC and DK responses 
in OEC should not correspond.
Method
Participants
　Participants were 158 undergraduate and 
graduate students from one university (73 
males, 85 females, Mean age = 21.20 years, SD 
= 2.39 years). Questionnaires were distributed 
in classes related to psychology. The face sheet 
of the questionnaire included assurances that 
participation was voluntary and data would 
remain anonymous and confidential.  Additional 
points for course credit were given at each 
participant’s request.
Procedure
　 T w o  q u e s t i o n s  w e r e  p r i n t e d  i n  t h e 
questionnaire: “What is your feeling in the 
situations below?” (self emotion condition: SEC), 
and “What is another person’s general feeling in 
the situations below?” (other emotion condition: 
OEC). There were 20  unequivocal situations 
(10 situations eliciting positive emotion and 
10 eliciting negative emotion) and 20 equivocal 
situations. A total 40 situations were presented 
in SEC and OEC respectively (see Tables 1, 2, and 
3)１. Participants judged the emotions using five-
point scales; -2 (very bad), -1 (slightly bad), 0 (don’t 
know), 1 (slightly good), 2 (very good). 
　Unequivocal situations and equivocal situations 
were the same in SEC and OEC and presented 
in random order in each condition. However, 
the ordering of conditions differed in two types 
of questionnaire. In one questionnaire (used in 
the self-first condition: SFC),  inferences about 
emotions of the self were presented first, before 
inferences about the emotions of others, while 
in the other questionnaire (other-first condition; 
OFC) inferences about the emotions of others 
were presented first. The conditions of SFC and 
OFC were counterbalanced across participants.
Results
　The data of two men and two women were 
excluded from analysis because they reversed 
SEC and OEC. (The data of participants who 
failed to answer every question were included.)
　Table 1 and Table 2 show the numbers 
of participants who rated each unequivocal 
situation from -2 to +2 for negative and positive 
emotions, respectively. The mean rating scale 
values in positive-emotion situations were almost 
all greater than zero, while the mean rating 
scale values in negative-emotion situations were 
almost all negative. In unequivocal situations, 
responses of 0 (don’t know) were rare.
　Table 3 presents the ratings of emotions in the 
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Table 1　 Number (%) of persons who made each rating and mean (and SD) rating 
values in unequivocal negative situations.
Table 2　 Number (%) of persons who made each rating and mean (SD) rating values in 
unequivocal positive situations.
“Don’t Know” responses in young adults’ inferences about the emotions of self and others in equivocal versus unequivocal emotional situations
― 5 ―
equivocal situation. The mean rating scale values 
ranged from -1 to 1, except for situations 17, 19, 
and 20 (“I go skiing”, “I go to a pastry buffet”, 
and “I go swimming in the sea”), suggesting that 
responses of zero (don’t know) were present in 
the equivocal situation.
　The number of DK responses ( i .e . ,  “0” 
ratings) in unequivocal and equivocal situations 
were summed up respectively to calculate the 
frequency of DK response (maximum = 20, 
respectively). These data were analyzed using 
a 2 (situation: unequivocal vs, equivocal ) × 2 
(person; SEC vs. OEC) × 2 (inferencing order: 
SFC vs OFC) ANOVA, with situation and person 
as within-subject factors and inferencing order 
as a between-subjects factor.
Table 3　 Number (%) of persons who made each rating and mean (SD) rating values in 
equivocal situations.
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　As indicated in Table 4, the main effects of 
situation (F (1, 152) = 418.34, partial η2 = .73, p 
< .001) and person (F (1, 152) = 14.04, partial η2 
= .09, p < .001) were significant. The frequency 
of DK responses in the equivocal situation (M 
= 11.85, SD = 6.83) was greater than that in the 
unequivocal situation (M = 1.09, SD = 2.00) (p < 
.001). DK responses were more frequent for OEC 
(M = 7.39, SD = 5.40) than for SEC (M = 5.55, SD 
= 4.40) (p < .001). 
　The situation × person interaction was 
significant (F (1, 152) = 206.38, partial η2 = 
.18, p < .001). Post hoc tests indicated that in 
unequivocal situations, the frequency of DK 
responses did not differ between SEC (M = .72, 
SD = 1.63) and OEC (M = .45, SD = .98), while 
in equivocal situations the frequency of DK 
responses was greater for OEC (M = 7.02, SD = 
5.01) than for SEC (M = 4.83, SD = 3.48) (p < .001).
　The situation × inferencing order interaction 
was also significant (F (1, 152) = 74.07, partial η2 
= .05, p < .01). Post hoc tests indicated that the 
frequency of DK responses in the unequivocal 
situation did not differ between SFC (M = .97, SD 
= 1.67) and OFC (M = 1.29, SD = 2.44), while in the 
equivocal situation the frequency of DK response 
was greater for SFC (M = 12.80, SD = 6.74) than 
for OFC (M = 10.32, SD = 6.75) (p < .05). 
　The correspondence between DK responses 
in SEC and in OEC was analyzed in two ways. 
First, the correlation between DK response in 
SEC and in OEC was calculated2）. As shown in 
Table 5, all variables were positively correlated 
except SEC in the equivocal situation and OEC in 
the unequivocal situation.
Table 4　Mean (SD) frequency of DK response in each condition.
Table 5　Correlations of DK responses between conditions.
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　The second analysis investigated three response 
patterns:  (1) self only: DK responses appearing 
only in SEC; (2) other only: DK responses 
appearing only in OEC; (3) both: DK responses 
appearing in both SEC and OEC. Tables 6, 7, 
and 8 show the number of persons who produced 
“self only”, “other only”, or “both” response 
patterns in the negative and positive unequivocal 
situations and in the equivocal situation, 
respectively１. 
　DK responses in the unequivocal situation were 
rare and thus not tested statistically. However, 
the descriptive statistics suggest that the 
number of persons who produced the “self only” 
responsepattern was generally greater than that 
for the other two response patterns (see Tables 6 
and 7).
　Chi square tests (1 × 3) were performed on 
the number of persons who produced “self only”, 
“other only”, and “both” response patterns 
in each equivocal situation. Table 8 shows 
the results of multiple comparisons using the 
nominal level of Ryan1. For the results that 
were significant, the number of participants who 
produced the “other only” response pattern was 
greater than that for the other two response 
patterns, except for situation 16 (“I watch a 
romance movie”).
Table 6　Response patterns in unequivocal negative situations.
Table 7　Response patterns in unequivocal positive situations.
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Discussion
　This study investigated how people around 
20 years of age make “don’t know” responses in 
inferring the emotions of others. We compared 
unequivocal and equivocal situations, inferences 
of the emotions of oneself (SEC) versus others 
(OEC), as well  as correspondences in DK 
responses in these conditions, and effects of order 
of presentation of self versus other inferences.
　In general, situations that were assumed to be 
unequivocally negative received negative ratings, 
and those assumed to be unequivocally positive 
were given positive ratings, while equivocal 
situations received more neutral ratings. The 
frequency of DK responses was greater in in 
the equivocal situation than in the unequivocal 
situation, supporting Hypothesis 1. However, 
there were unequivocal situations that received 
more neutral ratings (e.g., “The clothes which I 
want are sold out,” “I am treated to dinner”). 
　Further, there were equivocal situation that 
received few DK responses (e.g., “I go to a pastry 
buffet.” “I go swimming in the sea.”). Future 
studies should pre-test and select the situations 
more rigorously.
　More DK responses were produced in inferring 
others’ emotions than in inferring emotions of 
the self, supporting Hypothesis 2.  Further, in 
equivocal situations, more DK responses were 
produced in OEC than in SEC, while there was no 
such difference in unequivocal situations. Thus 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not independent. Kondo 
(2014b) indicated that DK responses in inferring 
the emotions of others appeared from about 
the age of 6 years, although uncertainty about 
the emotions of others was not yet robust. The 
present study shows that people around 20 years 
of age are able to recognize this uncertainty 
to some extent. However, the mean frequency 
of DK responses in OEC was about seven (35%) 
in a maximum of 20 equivocal situations (see 
Table 4). Gnepp and Klayman (1992) also noted 
that even college students did not adequately 
recognize equivocal situations. In other words, 
Table 8　Response patterns in equivocal situations.
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people around 20 years of age may still not fully 
recognize uncertainty about the emotions of 
others. It is possible that people have a tendency 
to “over infer” when they infer the emotions 
of others. The present study suggests that it is 
difficult to answer “don’t know” in inferring the 
emotions of others for young adults as well as 
for children.
　In equivocal situations, the frequency of 
occurrence of DK responses was greater when 
questions referring to the self were presented 
before questions about others (SFC) than when 
other-focused questions were presented first 
(OFC). This effect did not appear in unequivocal 
situations. This result partially supports 
Hypothesis 3 and suggests that inferring the 
emotions of the self activates self-consciousness 
and discrimination between self and others, thus 
increasing the frequency of occurrence of DK 
response. However, this effect was not restricted 
to the other emotion condition (OEC). In future 
research, more specific experimental procedures 
that activate self-schemas could clarify this 
difference.
　Some significant correlations were found 
between DK responses in self-emotion and other-
emotion conditions, such that participants 
who made DK responses in SEC also made DK 
responses in OEC. However, these effects were 
not strong. The stronger correlations were 
found between the two self-emotion conditions 
(unequivocal and equivocal), and the two other-
emotion conditions (unequivocal and  equivocal). 
Further, DK responses in SEC (equivocal) were 
not related to DK responses in OEC (unequivocal). 
Analysis of the response patterns of “self only”, 
“other only”, and “both” indicates that the 
number of persons who produced the response 
pattern of “other only” was greater than the 
numbers who produced “self only” or “both”. This 
lack of correspondence between DK responses 
in SEC and DK responses in OEC supports 
Hypothesis 4. In other words, the projection of 
inferencing about the self, which is an egocentric 
process, does not appear (or appears only 
weakly) in DK responses in inferencing about 
the emotions of others. This contradicts previous 
findings of the influence of egocentric processes 
on inferencing about others (e.g., Van Boven 
& Lowenstein, 2003; Kondo & Ikegami, 2012). 
Although we didn’t conduct statistical tests, it 
is interesting that in unequivocal situations, 
more participants produced “self only” response 
patterns. It is possible that DK responses in 
inferring the emotions of others are based on 
recognition of the difference between self and 
others. There is a need for additional evidence 
about the mechanisms related to the process of 
recognition of uncertainty about the emotions of 
others.
　In summary, this study had three main 
findings: (1) To some extent, people around 
the age of 20 make “don’t know” responses in 
inferring the emotions of others in equivocal 
situations. (2) Inferring the emotions of self 
promotes the recognition of uncertainty about 
the emotions of others. (3) “Don’t know” 
responses in inferring the emotions of others 
may not be based on projections of self-inference.
　Two limitations of the present study should be 
noted. First, the frequency of DK responses in 
SEC for equivocal situations was high, although 
we expected that even in equivocal situations 
the DK responses in SEC would be rare. DK 
responses in inferring the emotion of self were 
seldom observed in preschoolers (Kondo, 2014b). 
Thus this response may be peculiar to people 
around 20 years old. It is unclear what this 
type of DK response signifies in this study; for 
example, “I don’t experience this situation”, “I 
feel differently about this from day to day”, 
or “I don’t have either positive or negative 
feeling”). Until now, it has been assumed that the 
emotions of the self are understood. However, 
investigations of “don’t know” responses in 
inferring the emotions of self may lead to new 
developments in the field of self-understanding. 
　The second limitation is the ordering of 
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conditions; that is, inferring the emotions of 
self first (SFC) versus inferring the emotions 
of others first (OFC). This was not a strict 
experimental manipulation, because instructions 
for both conditions were presented on the same 
page in the questionnaire. In fact, as noted in 
the Results, some participants confused SEC 
and OEC. Additional research is required to 
investigate effects of SFC and OFC in more detail 
by making the condition settings more stringent, 
for example, by using an experiment rather than 
a questionnaire survey.
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Attention
1)  In the questionnaire actually used (in 
Japanese), the subjects of each sentence were 
omitted and only the situations were included. 
In the Tables, “I” was provisionally inserted 
into the situations.
2)  There were individual differences. The range 
of DK response were 0 - 14 in self-unequivocal 
situation, 0 – 18 in self-equivocal situation, 0 – 
6 in other-unequivocal situation, and 0 – 20 in 
other-equivocal situation. 
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